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Same-Sex Marriage and Loving v. 
Virginia: Analogy or Disanalogy?  
Ronald Turner* 
Abstract 
In its 1967 decision in Loving v. Virginia, the United States 
Supreme Court struck down Virginia antimiscegenation laws 
prohibiting and criminalizing interracial marriages, holding that 
the challenged laws violated the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. In recent federal appeals court decisions, Loving has 
been invoked as an authoritative analogy supporting plaintiffs’ 
claims that same-sex marriage bans violate the Constitution. This 
Essay considers the posited Loving analogy and the contentions 
(1) that different-race marriage and same-sex marriage 
prohibitions present similar, albeit not identical, instances of 
unconstitutional state limitations on an individual’s freedom to 
marry the person of his or her choice, and (2) that interracial 
marriage bans are conceptually distinguishable from laws 
forbidding same-sex marriages and therefore do not violate the 
Constitution. The Essay concludes that Loving is a useful and 
authoritative analogy supporting the claims of plaintiffs who 
contend, among other things, that states may not constitutionally 
deny same-sex couples the right to marry based solely on the 
traditional view that marriage is, and should only be, the legal 
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I. Introduction 
In October 2014 the United States Supreme Court declined 
to review federal appeals courts’ decisions invalidating same-sex 
marriage bans in the states of Indiana, Oklahoma, Utah, 
Virginia, and Wisconsin.1 President Barack Obama remarked 
that the Court’s denials of certiorari in those cases “signals that 
although the Court was not quite ready—it didn’t have sufficient 
votes to follow Loving v. Virginia and go ahead and indicate an 
equal-protection right across the board—it was a consequential 
and powerful signal of the changes that have taken place in 
society and that the law is having to catch up.”2  
President Obama referred, of course, to Loving v. Virginia,3 
the Court’s 1967 decision striking down Virginia’s 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
316 (2014); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
308 (2014); Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
271 (2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
265 (2014). 
 2. Jeffrey Toobin, The Obama Brief, NEW YORKER (Oct. 27, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/27/obama-brief (last visited Jan. 
24, 2015) (quoting President Obama on the approval of same-sex marriage 
through the political process) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 3. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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antimiscegenation4 laws prohibiting and criminalizing interracial 
marriages. In that seminal ruling the Court determined that the 
Commonwealth’s antimiscegenation regime, which was “designed 
to maintain White Supremacy” and deprived the plaintiffs of the 
liberty to marry a person of the other race,5 violated the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.6 
Is President Obama correct in associating Loving’s 
invalidation of interracial marriage bans with claims that laws 
prohibiting marriage between persons of the same sex violate the 
Constitution? Does Loving provide an authoritative analogy7 
supporting the claimed right to same-sex marriage? Yes, say 
those who posit that interracial marriage and same-sex marriage 
prohibitions present similar, albeit not identical, instances of 
unconstitutional state limitations on all individuals’ right and 
freedom to marry the person of their choice.8 No, say those who 
                                                                                                     
 4. The word “miscegenation” is a combination of the Latin words miscere 
(meaning “to mix) and genus (race). See RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL 
INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 20 (2003). “Miscegenation” 
was first used in 1864 in a pamphlet discussing the theory of the blending of 
races. See Emily Field Van Tassel, “Only the Law Would Rule Between Us”: 
Antimiscegenation, the Moral Economy of Dependency, and the Debate Over 
Rights After the Civil War, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 873, 896 n.93 (1995) (discussing 
development of the term “miscegenation”).  
 5. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11, 12. 
 6. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 7. On analogy in legal argument, see generally Scott Brewer, Exemplary 
Reasoning, Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by 
Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923 (1996) (presenting a detailed model of the 
analogical reasoning process). 
 8. See Randall Kennedy, Marriage and the Struggle for Gay, Lesbian, and 
Black Liberation, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 781, 789 (discussing several of the 
differences between the conflicts over interracial and same-sex marriage); see 
also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL 
LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 11 (1996) (“The arguments rejected by the 
[Loving] Court are eerily similar to those advanced by traditionalist opponents 
of same-sex marriage.”); Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class 
Citizenship, and Law’s Social Meanings, 97 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1272 n.15 (2011) 
(finding the Loving analogy persuasive and arguing that laws banning same-sex 
marriage present “sex discrimination in a deeper sense: hostility to 
homosexuality is fundamentally about policing sex roles, and sex stereotyping is 
the principal evil at which sex equality doctrine takes aim”); Christopher R. 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND LOVING V. VIRGINIA 267 
 
argue that laws forbidding interracial marriages are different 
from and should not be equated with laws prohibiting same-sex 
marriages. On that view, same-sex marriage is factually and 
conceptually distinguishable from the same-race marriage 
mandate invalidated by Loving.9 
This Essay’s discussion of the posited Loving analogy focuses 
on the recent decisions by the United States Courts of Appeals for 
the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits addressing 
the issue of the constitutionality of state-law prohibitions of 
same-sex marriage.10 Part II examines the Supreme Court’s 
Loving decision. Can Loving properly be invoked by those 
claiming the right to marry a person of the same sex, the issue 
considered in Part III? Or, as considered in Part IV, is Loving an 
inapt analogy, a disanalogy, that does not lend support to the 
                                                                                                     
Leslie, Embracing Loving: Trait-Specific Marriage Laws and Heightened 
Scrutiny, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1077, 1127 (2014) (arguing that antimiscegenation 
laws assumed and “did not cause the theory of white supremacy. . . . Similarly, 
gender-specific marriage laws are based on—or supported because of—the 
assumption of female submission and inferiority”); Rachel Moran, Loving and 
the Legacy of Unintended Consequences, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 239, 271 (noting that 
“the same-sex marriage debate so far has drawn primarily on Loving’s analysis 
of race and subordination”); Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation 
Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145, 162 (1988) (“If 
the Loving analogy is taken seriously, it follows that the equal protection clause 
forbids the denial of marriage licenses to gay couples . . . .”).  
 9. See Robert H. Bork, The Judge’s Role in Law and Culture, 1 AVE MARIA 
L. REV. 19, 26 (2003) (noting that the Loving analogy is “preposterous”); David 
Orgon Coolidge, Playing the Loving Card: Same-Sex Marriage and the Politics of 
Analogy, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 201, 204 (1998) (“‘[T]he Loving analogy’ has been of 
vital political utility to the advocates of same-sex marriage precisely because it 
is more about politics than law,” and “those advocating ‘same-sex marriage’ are 
. . . ‘playing the Loving card’”); Richard F. Duncan, From Loving to Romer: 
Homosexual Marriage and Moral Discernment, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 239, 241 
(1998) (“The so-called ‘Loving Analogy’ is a problem for those defending 
marriage laws, but not an insurmountable problem. Prohibiting interracial 
marriages is one thing; recognizing that marriage is an equal partnership 
between one man and one woman is something quite different.”); Lynn D. 
Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 
1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 62, 76 (describing why the argument for same-sex marriage 
is distinguishable from that in Loving); Lynn D. Wardle & Lincoln C. Oliphant, 
In Praise of Loving: Reflections on the “Loving Analogy” for Same-Sex Marriage, 
51 HOW. L.J. 117, 120 (2007) (arguing that the Loving analogy for same-sex 
marriage illegitimately attempts to use a cultural icon for political purposes).  
 10. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (listing cases). 
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claim that states may not constitutionally forbid marriages 
between male-male and female-female couples?  
Answers to the foregoing questions often depend on the 
framing of and the level of generality at which the query is posed. 
An analogy operating at a low level of generality11 would regard 
Loving solely as a case about interracial marriage bans and 
facilitates distinguishing Loving from the specific claim made in 
the cases challenging same-sex marriage prohibitions. 
Alternatively, and as I prefer and conclude, framing the question 
presented in Loving and the same-sex marriage cases at a high 
level of generality—can states constitutionally deny the right to 
marry based on traditional views and prejudices regarding the 
characteristics of the individuals seeking to exercise that right?—
renders Loving a useful and authoritative analogy supporting 
same-sex marriage plaintiffs. 
II. Loving v. Virginia 
In 1958 two residents of Caroline County, Virginia12—
Mildred Jeter, an African-American woman, and Richard Perry 
Loving, a white man—traveled to and were married in 
Washington, D.C. Returning to Virginia to live as husband and 
wife, they were arrested, indicted, and convicted of violating two 
sections of Virginia law criminalizing interracial marriages. One 
section prohibited a “white person and colored person” from 
leaving Virginia “for the purpose of being married” with the 
intent to “return to and reside” in the Commonwealth and 
“cohabitating as man and wife.”13 The other section provided that 
                                                                                                     
 11. See Emily Sherwin, Judges as Rulemakers, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 929 
(2006) (“The rules and reasons courts cite in support of analogies tend to operate 
at a low level of generality.”). 
 12. See RACHEL MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE 
AND ROMANCE 95 (2001) (discussing Loving). 
 13. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 4 (1967) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-58 
(1960)). State law defined “white person” as a person having “no trace whatever 
of any blood other than Caucasian,” and also deemed as white “persons who 
have one-sixteenth or less of the blood of the American Indian and have no other 
non-Caucasic blood . . . .” Id. at 5 n.4 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-54 (1960)). 
The exception for persons with one-sixteenth or less of the blood of the American 
Indian “is apparently accounted for . . . by ‘the desire of all to recognize as an 
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“[i]f any white person intermarry with a colored person, or any 
colored person intermarry with a white person, he shall be guilty 
of a felony” punishable by imprisonment of “not less than one nor 
more than five years.”14  
The trial judge sentenced the Lovings to one year in jail; that 
sentence was suspended so long as the couple left Virginia and 
did not return for twenty-five years. In handing down this 
sentence the judge made the following statement: 
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay 
and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but 
for the interference with his arrangement there would be no 
cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races 
shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.15 
Suing the Commonwealth, the Lovings contended that 
Virginia’s antimiscegenation laws violated the Equal Protection 
and Due Process Clauses of the Virginia and United States 
Constitutions. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the 
interracial marriage ban, opining that challenges like the 
Lovings’ “are properly addressable to the legislature, which 
enacted the law in the first place, and not to this court, whose 
prescribed role in the separate powers of government is to 
adjudicate, and not to legislate.”16 
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Lovings 
argued that the “broad guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . were open-ended and meant to be expounded in 
light of changing times and circumstances.”17 Virginia responded 
that the “desirability, character and scope of a policy of 
                                                                                                     
integral and honored part of the white race the descendants of John Rolfe and 
Pocahontas.’” Id. (quoting Walter Plecker, The New Family and Race 
Improvement, 17 VA. HEALTH BULL., EXTRA NO. 12 at 25–26 (1925)). “Colored 
person” was defined as any person “in whom there is ascertainable any Negro 
blood.” Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN § 1-14 (1960)). 
 14. Id. at 4 (quoting VA. CODE ANN § 20-59 (1960)). Virginia’s 
antimiscegenation regime also automatically voided all marriages between a 
white and colored person with no court proceeding required. See id. (discussing 
VA. CODE ANN § 20-57 (1960)). 
 15. Id. at 3 (quoting trial judge) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 16. Loving v. Virginia, 147 S.E. 2d 78, 82 (Va. 1966), rev’d, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967). 
 17. Brief for Appellants at 30, Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395).  
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permitting or preventing such alliances” falls within “the 
exclusive province of the legislature of each State . . . a province 
which the judiciary may not, under well settled constitutional 
doctrine, invade.”18 The Commonwealth argued that if the Court 
questioned its judgment and wisdom in this area “it would 
quickly find itself mired in a veritable Serbonian bog of 
conflicting scientific opinion upon the effects of interracial 
marriage, and the desirability of preventing such alliances, from 
the physical, biological, genetic, anthropological, cultural, 
psychological and sociological point of view.”19 
Additionally, and significantly, Virginia expressed its 
concern about procreating interracial couples. The 
Commonwealth’s brief to the Court quoted the following passage 
from a decision by the Louisiana Supreme Court: 
[A] state statute which prohibits interracial marriage or 
cohabitation between members of different races we think falls 
squarely within the police power of the state, which has an 
interest in maintaining the purity of the races and in 
preventing the propagation of half-breed children. Such 
children have difficulty in being accepted by society, and there 
is no doubt that children in such a situation are 
burdened . . . with a feeling of inferiority as to their status in 
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a 
way unlikely ever to be undone.20 
In the oral argument before the Supreme Court, Virginia’s 
counsel, R. D. McIlwaine III, advised the Justices that Virginia’s 
ban served “a legitimate legislative objective of preventing the 
sociological and psychological evils which attend interracial 
marriages.”21 McIlwaine also urged that the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment intended that “a law which equally 
forbade the members of one race to marry members of another 
race, with the same penal sanction on both, did treat the 
                                                                                                     
 18. Brief and Appendix of Appellee at 50, Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 
395). 
 19. Id. at 41. 
 20. Id. at 35 (quoting State v. Brown, 108 So. 2d 233, 234 (La. 1959) 
(quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954))). 
 21. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395). 
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individuals of both races equally.”22 Questioning that view, one of 
the Justices remarked that while the “prohibition is the 
same . . . it’s the common sense and pragmatics of it that it’s the 
result of the old slavery days, the old feeling that the white man 
was superior to the colored man, which was exactly what the 
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to prevent.”23  
Issuing its decision in June 1967, the Court, noting that 
Virginia was then one of sixteen states prohibiting interracial 
marriages,24 struck down the Commonwealth’s law. Speaking for 
a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren rejected the 
Commonwealth’s argument that the equal protection mandate 
was satisfied “so long as white and Negro participants were 
similarly punished.”25 He noted that this equal application theory 
of the Fourteenth Amendment was at one time recognized in Pace 
v. Alabama.26 That theory was disapproved in McLaughlin v. 
Florida,27 wherein the Court struck down a Florida law 
prohibiting cohabitation by “[a]ny negro man and white woman, 
or any white man and negro woman, who are not married to each 
other.”28 Pace thus “represents a limited view of the Equal 
                                                                                                     
 22. Id. at 27. 
 23. Id. at 33. 
 24. Interestingly, the number of states allowing interracial marriage at the 
time of the Court’s 1967 ruling in Loving—thirty-four—is comparable to the 
thirty-five states “now positioned to recognize same-sex marriage.” DeBoer v. 
Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 435 (6th Cir. 2014) (Daughtery, J., dissenting), cert. 
granted, 83 U.S.L.W. 3315 (2015). 
 25. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967). 
 26. 106 U.S. 583 (1883). In Pace, the Court rejected an equal protection 
challenge to a state criminal law’s penalty enhancement for adultery and 
fornication engaged in by black–white couples. The Court reasoned that 
punishing different-race couples more harshly than same-race couples engaging 
in the same conduct did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the 
more severe punishment was “directed against the offense designated and not 
against the person of any particular color or race. The punishment of each 
offending person, whether white or black, is the same.” Id. at 585. 
 27. 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
 28. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.05 (1962). Interestingly, Connie Hoffman and 
Dewey McLaughlin, the couple challenging the Florida law, were married. 
“[T]hey were afraid to submit their marriage certificate at trial for a very simple 
reason: the penalty for interracial marriage was ten years in jail, while the 
penalty for cohabitation was ‘only’ one year.” 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 296 (2014). 
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Protection Clause which has not withstood analysis in the 
subsequent decisions of this Court.”29 As the McLaughlin Court 
made clear, the equal protection inquiry and analysis “does not 
end with a showing of equal application among the members of 
the class defined by the legislation.”30 Courts must instead ask 
and answer the question whether statutory classifications 
arbitrarily or invidiously discriminate against those covered by 
and those excluded from the law.31  
The “clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious 
racial discrimination in the States,” Chief Justice Warren wrote 
in Loving.32 Heeding this purpose, and subjecting Virginia’s 
statutory ban to the “‘most rigid scrutiny,’”33 he concluded that 
Virginia’s antimiscegenation law violated the Equal Protection 
Clause. No “legitimate overriding purpose independent of 
invidious racial discrimination” justified the racial classification, 
and Virginia’s limitation of the interracial marriage ban to 
marriages involving whites revealed that the law was “designed 
to maintain White Supremacy.”34 The Chief Justice had “no doubt 
that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial 
classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal 
Protection Clause.”35 
Moreover, the Court held that Virginia deprived the Lovings 
of their liberty without due process of law. “The freedom to marry 
has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men,”36 and 
marriage is “fundamental to our very existence and survival.”37 
                                                                                                     
 29. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 188. 
 30. Id. at 191. 
 31. See id. (“The courts must reach and determine the question whether 
the classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its 
purpose . . . .”). 
 32. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967). 
 33. Id. at 11 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 
(1944)). 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. at 12. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). 
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Opining that the freedom and decision “to marry, or not marry, a 
person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be 
infringed by the State,”38 Chief Justice Warren observed that the 
at-issue law denying “this fundamental freedom . . . deprive[s] all 
the State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law. The 
Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to 
marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations.”39  
III. Analogy? 
Does Loving v. Virginia provide a helpful and authoritative 
analogy for the proposition that anti-same-sex marriage laws 
violate the Constitution? Affirmative answers to this question can 
be found in recent decisions invalidating same-sex marriage bans. 
In Kitchen v. Herbert,40 the Tenth Circuit invalidated Utah’s 
constitutional and statutory provisions recognizing marriage as 
only the legal union between a man and a woman.41 Judge Carlos 
F. Lucero’s opinion for a majority of the three-judge panel noted 
Loving’s conclusion that Virginia’s prohibition of interracial 
marriages violated the Due Process Clause.42 He observed that, 
while Loving involved a “naturally procreative” opposite-sex 
couple, in a case decided thirty years later the Supreme Court 
described Loving as a right-to-marry and not as a right-to-
procreate case.43 Judge Lucero also considered Utah’s assertion 
that its constitutional provision prohibiting same-sex marriage 
merely defined marriage, and the state’s effort to contrast “the 
traditional definition of marriage with the anti-miscegenation 
laws invalidated in Loving.”44 Citing United States v. Windsor,45 
Judge Lucero declined to defer to the state’s definition.46  
                                                                                                     
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 265 (2014). 
 41. See UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29 (“Marriage consists only of the legal union 
between a man and a woman.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.1(a) (2013) (“It is the 
policy of this state to recognize as marriage only the legal union of a man and a 
woman . . . .”). 
 42. See Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1209. 
 43. Id. at 1209–10 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)). 
 44. Id. at 1216 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Now consider Bostic v. Schaefer,47 the Fourth Circuit’s recent 
decision striking down Virginia’s same-sex marriage ban.48 In his 
opinion for the court Judge Henry F. Floyd described Loving as a 
case involving and protecting the fundamental right to marry, a 
right encompassing the right to same-sex marriage.49 “Over the 
decades, the Supreme Court has demonstrated that the right to 
marry is an expansive liberty interest that may stretch to 
accommodate changing societal norms. . . . [I]n Loving v. 
Virginia, the Supreme Court invalidated a Virginia law that 
prohibited white individuals from marrying individuals of other 
races.”50 Loving did not define the claimed right as “‘the right to 
interracial marriage,’” Judge Floyd stated, but instead spoke “of a 
broad right to marry that is not circumscribed based on the 
characteristics of the individuals seeking to exercise that right.”51 
Virginia argued that Loving involved the marriage of an opposite-
sex couple and could not be used to conclude that the Supreme 
Court would protect the choice to enter into a same-sex marriage. 
Not persuaded by that argument, Judge Floyd, citing and relying 
on the Court’s post-Loving decisions,52 had “no reason to suspect 
that the Supreme Court would accord the choice to marry 
                                                                                                     
 45. 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013). The holding in Windsor demonstrates “that a 
provision labeled a ‘definition’ is not immune from constitutional scrutiny,” 
Judge Lucero saw “no reason to allow Utah’s invocation of its power to define 
the marital relation . . . to become a talisman, by whose magic power the whole 
fabric which the law had erected . . . is at once dissolved.” Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 
1215–16 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
 46. Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1216. 
 47. 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 308 (2014). 
 48. See VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A (“That only a union between one man and 
one woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized by this Commonwealth 
and its political subdivisions.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (1997) (“[M]arriage 
between persons of the same sex is prohibited” and “[a]ny marriage entered into 
by persons of the same sex in another state or jurisdiction shall be void in all 
respects in Virginia and any contractual rights created by such marriage shall 
be void and unenforceable”).  
 49. See Bostic, 760 F.3d at 375, 376. 
 50. Id. at 376 (internal citation omitted). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. at 377 (discussing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) and 
United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013)). 
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someone of the same sex any less respect than the choice to 
marry an opposite-sex individual who is of a different race . . . .”53  
The Seventh Circuit employed Loving as an anti-tradition 
analogue in Baskin v. Bogan.54 Indiana and Wisconsin, defending 
their respective prohibitions of same-sex marriage, argued that 
the traditional limitation of marriage to different-sex couples was 
a valid basis for the same-sex marriage bans. Writing for the 
court, Judge Richard A. Posner said that the States’ argument 
“runs head on into Loving . . . since the limitation of marriage to 
a person of the same race was traditional in a number of states 
when the Supreme Court invalidated it.”55 Declaring that 
tradition per se is not a legal ground for discrimination, he quoted 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s comment that it is “‘revolting to have 
no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in 
the time of Henry IV.’”56 In Judge Posner’s view, “if no social 
benefit is conferred by a tradition and it is written into law and it 
discriminates against a number of people and does them harm 
beyond just offending them, it is not a harmless anachronism; it 
is a violation of the equal protection clause, as in Loving.”57 
In Latta v. Otter,58 the Ninth Circuit held that same-sex 
marriage prohibitions in Idaho and Nevada violated the Equal 
Protection Clause. In a concurring opinion Judge Stephen Roy 
Reinhardt addressed the States’ argument that gays and lesbians 
denied the right to marry individuals of the same sex are “still 
                                                                                                     
 53. Id.  
 54. 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 316 (2014). 
 55. Baskin, 766 F.3d at 666. For Judge Posner, Virginia’s 
antimiscegenation regime was less severe than Wisconsin’s same-sex marriage 
ban. Virginia “did not forbid members of any racial group to marry, just to 
marry a member of a different race. . . . In contrast, Wisconsin law . . . prevents 
a homosexual from marrying any person with the same sexual orientation, 
which is to say . . . any person a homosexual would want or be willing to marry.” 
Id. at 667. 
 56. Id. at 666–67 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 
10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
577–78 (2003) (“[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has 
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason 
for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could 
save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack.”). 
 57. Baskin, 766 F.3d at 667. 
 58. 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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free to marry individuals of the opposite sex.”59 That argument 
was rebutted by Loving. Judge Reinhardt concluded:  
Mildred Jeter and Richard Loving were not barred from 
marriage altogether. Jeter was perfectly free to marry a black 
person, and Loving was perfectly free to marry a white person. 
They were each denied the freedom, however, to marry the 
person whom they chose—the other. The case of lesbians and 
gays is indistinguishable. A limitation on the right to marry 
another person, whether on account of race or for any other 
reason, is a limitation on the right to marry.60 
Idaho and Nevada argued further that because “man–
woman” and “genderless” marriages are mutually exclusive, 
permitting the latter would destroy the former.61 Judge 
Reinhardt did not agree. Loving declared that Virginia’s 
antimiscegenation laws deprived not only the Lovings but “all the 
State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law.”62 Thus, he 
reasoned, telling Virginians that they could not marry a person of 
a different race violated the constitutional rights of other citizens 
who were already in a same-race marriage or did not seek to 
enter into an interracial marriage.63 “When Idaho tells Idahoans 
or Nevada tells Nevadans that they are not free to marry the one 
they love if that person is of the same sex, it interferes with the 
universal right of all the State’s citizens—whatever their sexual 
orientation—to control their destiny.”64 
In a separate concurring opinion in Latta, Judge Marsha 
Siegel Berzon addressed the States’ contention that their same-
sex marriage bans did not violate the Equal Protection Clause 
because men as a class and women as a class were treated 
equally. She noted, correctly, that this equal application theory 
and justification were rejected in Loving. An “even-handed state 
purpose” restricting an individual’s “rights, choices, or 
opportunities” solely because of race violates the Equal Protection 
                                                                                                     
 59. Id. at 478 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see supra note 38 
and accompanying text. 
 63. See id. 
 64. Id at 479. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
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Clause “even if members of all racial groups are identically 
restricted with regard to interracial marriage.”65 Similarly, a sex-
based restriction of a person’s rights, choices, or opportunities 
violates the Clause even though both men and women are 
identically limited by same-sex marriage prohibitions.66 
In striking down Virginia’s antimiscegenation laws, Loving 
held that the Commonwealth could not constitutionally classify 
by race those persons who would and would not be allowed to 
enter into marriage. While this interpretation and application of 
the Constitution’s Equal Protection and Due Process mandates 
occurred in the context of a challenge to mandated same-race 
marriages, one can extract from the Court’s decision the general 
principle that state definitions of marriage specifying certain 
characteristics excluding individuals from entering into that 
institution are subject to constitutional challenge and scrutiny. 
This principle and the Loving analogy have been understandably 
invoked by those seeking judicial recognition and protection of 
the right to marry a person of the same sex.  
IV. Disanalogy? 
Consider now the view that Loving is not an analogue 
supporting judicial recognition of a right to same-sex marriage.  
In DeBoer v. Snyder,67 the Sixth Circuit upheld against 
constitutional challenge same-sex marriage prohibitions in 
Michigan,68 Ohio,69 Kentucky,70 and Tennessee.71 Judge Jeffrey S. 
Sutton’s opinion for the court concluded, among other things, that 
there was no fundamental right to enter into a same-sex 
                                                                                                     
 65. Id. at 483 (Berzon, J., concurring). 
 66. See id.  
 67. 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W. 3315 (2015). 
 68. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 551.1 (2012) (noting that marriage is 
“inherently a unique relationship between a man and a woman”). 
 69. See OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 (recognizing marriage as only “a union 
between one man and one woman”). 
 70. See KY. CONST. § 233A (“Only a marriage between one man and one 
woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in Kentucky.”). 
 71. See TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 18 (recognizing only marriages between one 
man and one woman as valid). 
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marriage. Asking “whether our nation has treated the right as 
fundamental and therefore worthy of protection under 
substantive due process,”72 he remarked that this “requirement 
often is met by placing the right in the Constitution, most 
obviously in (most of) the guarantees in the Bill of Rights. But the 
right to marry in general, and the right to gay marriage in 
particular, nowhere appear in the Constitution. That route for 
recognizing a fundamental right to same-sex marriage does not 
exist.”73 Nor did the claimed right to same-sex marriage “turn[] 
on bedrock assumptions about liberty” as the “first state high 
court to redefine marriage to include gay couples did not do so 
until 2003 in Goodridge [v. Department of Public Health].”74 
Turning to Loving, Judge Sutton wrote that the Court’s 1967 
holding that marriage is a fundamental right “confirmed only 
that ‘opposite-sex marriage’ would have been considered 
redundant, not that marriage included same-sex couples. Loving 
did not change the definition.”75 The Court’s statement that 
marriage is “fundamental to our very existence and survival” 
referred to “the procreative definition of marriage.” 76  
Had a gay African-American male and a gay Caucasian male 
been denied a marriage license in Virginia in 1968, would the 
Supreme Court have held that Virginia had violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment? No one to our knowledge thinks so, 
and no Justice to our knowledge has ever said so. The denial of 
the license would have turned not on the races of the 
applicants but on a request to change the definition of 
marriage.77  
                                                                                                     
 72. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 411; see also id. (“[T]he test is whether the right ‘is 
deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ and ‘implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were 
sacrificed.’” (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997))).  
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.; see Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).  
 75. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 411 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 83 
U.S.L.W. 3315 (2015). 
 76. Id.; see supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text (recounting the 
Loving Court’s discussion of marriage as a fundamental right). 
 77. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 411. 
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Thus, he concluded, “Loving addressed, and rightly corrected, 
an unconstitutional eligibility requirement for marriage; it did 
not create a new definition of marriage.”78 
One can agree that forty-six years ago the Supreme Court 
would have ruled against the hypothetical same-sex couple 
posited by Judge Sutton. But that agreement does not foreclose 
the argument that today anti-same-sex marriage laws violate the 
Constitution. Post-Loving Supreme Court rulings79 and the 
decisions of the Tenth, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits 
discussed in the preceding Part provide a jurisprudential 
backdrop for the contemporary consideration and analysis of the 
same-sex marriage issue.80 Conjuring up and focusing on an 
imaginary case circa 1968 does not acknowledge and avoids the 
need to grapple with current case law recognizing the same-sex 
marriage right.  
As for Judge Sutton’s conclusion that Loving did not create a 
new definition of marriage, it is true that Loving said nothing 
about same-sex marriage; this is not surprising as that issue was 
not before the Court. But Loving did effect a definitional change 
in the sixteen states that banned interracial marriage. In 
outlawing state mandates recognizing as valid only those 
marriages occurring between persons of the same race, the Court 
made clear that marriage could not be defined in racial and racist 
terms. The traditional definition of marriage as the union of 
persons of the same race was no longer valid. As a legal, moral, 
and practical matter, the Court’s invalidation of Virginia’s 
antimiscegenation regime redefined that which constituted a 
legally cognizable marriage in that state.  
Dissenting judges in the Tenth and Fourth Circuits’ same-sex 
marriage rulings did not subscribe to the Loving analogy. In 
Bishop v. Smith,81 the Tenth Circuit held unconstitutional 
                                                                                                     
 78. Id. 
 79. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013); Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 80. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 430 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting) (“These four cases 
from our sister circuits provide a rich mine of responses to every rationale raised 
by the defendants in the Sixth Circuit cases as a basis for excluding same-sex 
couples from contracting valid marriages.”). 
 81. 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 271 (2014). 
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Oklahoma’s same-sex marriage prohibition.82 Judge Paul J. Kelly 
Jr. opined that the state’s definition of marriage as the union 
between one man and one woman was “benign, and very much 
unlike race-based restrictions on marriage invalidated in 
Loving.”83 He rejected the argument that those denying the right 
to same-sex marriage “‘might just as easily have argued that 
interracial couples are by definition excluded from the institution 
of marriage.’ . . . But, as far as I can tell, no one in Loving v. 
Virginia . . . could have argued that racial homogeneity was an 
essential element of marriage.”84 
Contrary to Judge Kelly’s supposition, a racial homogeneity 
argument was made in Loving. As previously noted, Virginia 
contended that antimiscegenation laws fell within the police 
power of states interested in the posited purity of the races and 
concerned about the propagation of “half-breed children.”85 
Consequently, racial homogeneity in marriage was deemed by the 
state to be an essential element of marriage. Loving’s rejection of 
this essentiality argument provides analogical support for those 
who contend that states have wrongfully and unconstitutionally 
deemed sexual heterogeneity to be an essential feature of 
marriage.  
The Loving analogy was also rejected by Judge Paul V. 
Niemeyer in Bostic v. Schaefer’s invalidation of Virginia’s same-
sex marriage ban.86 “Loving simply held that race, which is 
completely unrelated to the institution of marriage, could not be 
the basis of marital restrictions. To stretch Loving’s holding to 
say that the right to marry is not limited by gender and sexual 
orientation is to ignore the inextricable, biological link between 
marriage and procreation that the Supreme Court has always 
recognized.”87 In Judge Niemeyer’s view, the antimiscegenation 
law “struck down in Loving . . . had no relationship to the 
                                                                                                     
 82. See OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 35 (“Marriage in this state shall consist only 
of the union of one man and one woman.”). 
 83. Bishop, 760 F.3d at 1113 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
 84. Id. (quoting Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1216 (10th Cir. 2014)). 
 85. See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text. 
 86. 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 308 (2014); see supra 
notes 47–53 and accompanying text. 
 87. 760 F.3d at 392 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
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foundational purposes of marriage, while the gender of the 
individuals in a marriage clearly does.”88 
This Loving disanalogy argument fails. To reiterate, Virginia 
unabashedly promoted and sought to maintain white supremacy 
via the criminalization of interracial marriages and the 
procreation of state-labeled mixed-race and half-breed children. 
As the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals declared in 1955, the 
Commonwealth enacted the interracial marriage ban to avoid the 
supposed problem of the propagation of “a mongrel breed of 
citizens.”89 Thus, the preservation of racial hierarchy was an 
integral and undeniable feature of Virginia’s conception of the 
“right” kind of marriage (whites only) and the procreation of the 
“right” kind of (full-breed white) children. Given these facts and 
white-supremacist realities, Judge Niemeyer’s suggestion that 
the interracial marriage prohibition had no relationship to what 
he understands to be the foundational purposes of marriage is 
incorrect. 
V. Conclusion 
Loving held that Virginia’s antimiscegenation regime 
violated the equal protection and due process rights of persons 
who wished to enter into different-race marriages. The Court’s 
decision protected the constitutional rights of Mildred Jeter and 
Richard Perry Loving and invalidated the Commonwealth’s 
antimiscegenation regime. Those who challenge same-sex 
marriage prohibitions analogously maintain that states have 
unconstitutionally infringed the rights of those who seek to marry 
the person of their choice. Like the Lovings, “[t]hey contend 
that . . . popular prejudices, nourished by deeply entrenched 
mythologies, were translated into laws or policies that have 
wrongly prevented or impeded couples from marrying.”90 On that 
view, definitions of marriage excluding different-race and same-
sex couples, grounded as they are on racial and gender 
                                                                                                     
 88. Id. 
 89. Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E. 2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 891 
(1955) (per curiam). 
 90. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 789. 
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classifications and in racist and heterosexist norms, implicate 
and deny rights protected by the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses. If this is correct, Loving’s invalidation of 
antimiscegenation laws provides a pertinent analogy supporting 
same-sex marriage claims. Having granted certiorari in Deboer,91 
the Supreme Court will perhaps address and take sides in the 
Loving analogy or disanalogy debate.  
 
                                                                                                     
 91. See Bourke v. Beshear, No. 14-574, 2015 WL 213651 (Jan. 16, 2015) 
(granting certiorari in several related cases, including DeBoer). 
